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 Pregledni rad
Summary: 
Sixty years ago, from 20th to 26th September 1959, the Nineteenth Conference 
of the International Maritime Committee (Comité Maritime International) was 
held in Rijeka. Facing the challenges arising from contemporary plans to use 
nuclear power in marine transport (in particular to use nuclear reactors as a 
source of transport for both civil and military ships), the Conference adopted a 
draft of a convention that aimed to address the issue of liability of the operators 
of nuclear ships. The draft convention reflected the fact that liability issues 
arising from nuclear ships considerably differ from those issues, arising from 
the operation of land-based nuclear reactors. This draft convention, which 
became later widely known as “the Rijeka Draft” in legal literature, provided 
for basic liability principles that were to be applied to operators of nuclear 
ships. The Rijeka Draft became crucial for the later developments in the field 
of international nuclear law, in particular for the adoption of the Brussels 
Convention on the Liability of Nuclear Ships at the Eleventh Session of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law in 1962. However, it also influenced 
the content of several other bi-lateral agreements. The 60th anniversary of the 
Rijeka Draft allows a good opportunity to revisit the principles provided by 
the draft convention as well as to revisit the impact of this draft on further 
development of international nuclear law.  
Keywords: nuclear liability; nuclear ships; international nuclear law; 
international maritime law; liability principles. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, from 20th to 26th September 1959, the Nineteenth Conference 
of the International Maritime Committee (Comité Maritime International, thereinafter 
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“the IMC”)1 was held in Rijeka. In fact, it was the first of the IMC conferences that 
wasn’t held in Western Europe2 and also the very first held in a Socialist country. 
190 participants, representing 21 different regional chapters of the IMC, took part at 
the Conference.3  Obviously, by organising the Conference in Rijeka, the Yugoslav 
regime aimed to show its openness to the West and willingness to co-operate on 
further development of international law.4 
This Nineteenth Conference of the IMC addressed in particular the issue of 
liability of operators of nuclear ships.5 The design, development and production of 
nuclear marine propulsion plants began in the United States in the 1940s, with the 
first test nuclear reactor started in 1953. The first nuclear-powered military submarine, 
“USS Nautilus”, was put to sea in 1955. In the following years, the US fleet of 
nuclear-powered submarines increased very quickly and, during the very late 1950s, 
approximately 12 nuclear powered submarines were launched. 
The Soviet Union followed the United Stated in developing nuclear-powered 
submarines. After overcoming many obstacles, including steam generation problems, 
radiation leaks and other difficulties, the first nuclear-powered submarine, “K-3 
Leninskiy Komsomol”, entered service in the Soviet Navy in 1958. 
Furthermore, there were considerable developments in the area of nuclear-
powered civil vessels. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the world’s first nuclear 
powered civilian vessel, the nuclear icebreaker “NS Lenin”, intended to aid shipping 
in frozen Arctic areas. In 1959, a working group of the United States Academy of 
Sciences predicted that there would be approximately 300 nuclear-powered ships by 
1 The International Maritime Committee (Comité Maritime International) was established as a 
non-governmental organisation in 1897 with the object to contribute by all appropriate means 
and activities to the unification of maritime law in all its aspects.
2 After Conferences in Brussels (1897), Antwerp (1898), London (1899), Paris (1900), Hamburg 
(1902), Amsterdam (1904), Liverpool (1905), Venice (1907), Bremen (1909), Paris (1911), 
Copenhagen (1913), Antwerp (1921), London (1922), Gothenburg (1923), Genoa (1925), 
Amsterdam (1927), Antwerp (1930), Oslo (1933), Paris (1937), Antwerp (1947), Amsterdam 
(1949), Naples (1951) and Madrid (1955). 
3 The event was reflected in the contemporary literature by Legendre, A., La conférence de Rijeka, 
Droit maritime français, vol. 36, 1959, pp. 707-709, Filipović, V., Problemi odgovornosti za 
nuklearne štete i Riječka konferencija CMI, Naša zakonitost, 1960, pp. 179-186, Chaveau, 
P., Les navires nucléaires á la Conférence de Rijeka, Sémaine juridique, 1960, pp. 1529-1530 
and by Thornton, W., The Nuclear Ship in the International Community, JAG Journal, vol. 
9, 3-4/1960, pp. 9-12. A more contemporary reference can be found in Filipović, V. Riječka 
konferencija međunarodnog pomorskog odbora (CMI-a) 1959. i odgovornost poduzetnika 
nuklearnih brodova. Zbornik Pravnog Fakulteta u Zagrebu, vol. 52, 6/2002, pp. 1181-1190.
4 Filipović, V. Riječka konferencija međunarodnog pomorskog odbora (CMI-a) 1959, p. 1182. 
5 The revision of the Article X of the International Convention for the Unification of certain rules 
of Law relating to the Bills of Lading and the revision of the Article XIV of the International 
Convention on the Unification of certain rules of law relating to assistance and salvage at sea 
were subject of discussion. Further topics, discussed at the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC 
included letters of indemnity in maritime transport, International Statute of Ships in Foreign 
Ports and the registry of operators of ships. See Lilar, A., Van den Bosch, C., Le Comité 
Maritime International 1897-1972 / International Maritime Committee 1897-1972, p. 114. 
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1970.6 
Only two months before the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC assembled in 
Rijeka, the first US-produced nuclear-powered cargo-passenger ship, “NS Savannah”, 
was launched. Italy and the United Kingdom simultaneously announced plans to 
construct nuclear ships.7
Consequently, after demonstrating that nuclear energy could be effectively used 
to provide marine propulsion, attention turned to the need to provide effective legal 
protections for the general public against radiation dangers and other forms of damage 
possibly caused by nuclear ships.8 Facing these challenges, efforts led to formulate 
a multilateral treaty to regulate matters of nuclear liability arising from the use of 
nuclear power in marine propulsion.
At the same time, the International Atomic Energy Agency (thereinafter “the 
IAEA”) and the OECD’s European Nuclear Energy Agency (thereinafter “the OECD/
NEA”) began preparing multilateral instruments that became the Convention on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (adopted in 1960, thereinafter “the Paris 
Convention”)9 and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 
(adopted in 1963, thereinafter “the Vienna Convention”).10 
However, these multilateral instruments were aimed exclusively at governing 
nuclear liability arising from the operation of land-based nuclear reactors.11  There 
was a common understanding, that matters of nuclear liability for damages incurred 
by the operation of nuclear ships must be reserved for a specialized international 
treaty.12 In contrast to the liability regime, which was to be established vis-á-vis the 
land-based nuclear reactors, several specific issues were identified, which were to be 
6 Hardy, M.  The Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, vol. 12, 3/1963, p. 778.
7 OECD, Nuclear Power for Merchant Ships, OECD Observer, 1970, p. 27. 
8 ibid, p. 29. 
9 The Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (adopted 29 July, 
1960), as amended by the Additional Protocol of 1964 (adopted 28 January, 1964, entered into 
force 1 April, 1968) and by the Protocol of 1982 (adopted 16 November, 1982, entered into 
force 7 October, 1988).
10 The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (adopted 21 May, 1963, entered 
into force 12 November, 1977), INFCIRC/500.
11 Handrlica, J., Novotná, M., The Vienna convention on civil liability for nuclear damage: past, 
evolution and perspectives, Juridical Tribune – Tribuna Juridica, vol. 8, 2018, pp. 55-56. 
12 Dagna, C. La responsabilitá dell´armatore di navi nucleari, Diritto ed economia nucleare, vol. 
1, 1959, pp. 267-269, Fergusson, E., Liability of Nuclear Powered Vessels: the Work Toward an 
International Convention – Some Problems and Principles, Atomic Energy Law Journal, vol. 
2, 1/1960, pp. 25-35, Seaver, R., The impact of nuclear propulsion on admirality and shipping 
law, In: American Bar Association (ed), Section of Negligence, Insurance and Compensation 
Law, Proceedings 1959-1960, American Bar Center, Chicago, 1960, pp. 178-188, Miller, C. 
Problems of International Legislation regulating the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, 
Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 3, 1962, pp. 306-308, Parlavantzas, P., La responsabilité des 
exploitants de navires nucléaires, Revue hellénique de droit international, vol. 15, 1962, pp. 
87-95, Carbone, F., Navires nucléaires, lois nationales et droit européen, Revue trim. de droit 
européen, vol. 4, 3/1968, pp. 332-336, Szasz, P. The Convention on the Liability of Operators 
of Nuclear Ships, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, vol. 2, 3/1971, pp. 547-553.
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addressed with particular regard to nuclear ships.13 
Firstly, it was obvious that, while land-based nuclear reactors might easily 
mitigate possible dangers by locating them far from populated areas, nuclear ships 
were designed to sail into foreign harbours. Consequently, although the Installation 
State was expected to appropriately compensate a nuclear incident by its land-based 
nuclear reactor (situated in its territory), the licensing State would not be under such 
intermediate pressure where the incident occurred in a distant harbour, where a nuclear 
ship bearing its flag was anchored.
Secondly, there was a question about whether the future liability regime would 
be common to both civil and warships, although the latter represented the majority of 
nuclear-powered vessels at the time. 
Thirdly, there was a question concerning whether the prospective international 
instrument would contain only rules applicable for operation of nuclear-powered 
vessels on the High Seas, or also govern issues of their entry to the ports of other than 
licensing States.
Facing these challenges, the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC adopted the 
draft of a convention that aimed to address the issue of liability of the operators 
of nuclear ships.14 This draft convention, which became later widely known as “the 
Rijeka Draft” in legal literature,15 provided for basic liability principles that were to 
be applied to operators of nuclear ships.
The Rijeka Draft became crucial for later developments in the field of 
international nuclear law.  In the following year, a working group of 150 experts met 
under the auspices of the IAEA in order to discuss those issues of nuclear liability 
arising both from the prospective operation of the land-based nuclear reactors and 
nuclear ships.16 Here, the “Panel of Legal Experts on Liability for Nuclear Propelled 
Ships” was charged with reviewing the Rijeka Draft.17 
Pursuant to the request of the Panel, the Secretariat of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency prepared a new draft convention. This became a subject of 
discussion at the Eleventh Session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, 
held in Brussels, from 17th to 29th April 1961.18 Due to certain disagreements (mainly 
13 Miller, C., op. cit., pp. 306-308.
14 Actually, the first ever draft of the prospective convention on the liability of the operators of 
nuclear ships was proposed by a subcommittee of the IMC at its meeting in Antwerp, in June, 
1959. This draft was submitted to the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC for further discussion. 
15 The text of the Rijeka Draft was reprinted in Progress in Nuclear Energy, vol. 3, 1962, pp. 321-
325.
16 Könz, P., Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships: the 1961 Brussels Conference, Progress in 
Nuclear Energy, vol. 3, 1962, p. 327-329.
17 The Panel was composed of experts from Albania, Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, 
Norway, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, 
United States and Yugoslavia. The report prepared by the panel was subsequently submitted to 
the Diplomatic Conference as the Document No. 3 and a revised version of the Rijeka Draft as 
the Document No. 3 – A. 
18 Belli, G., La conferenza diplomatica per una convenzione sulla responsibilitá civile degli 
utilizzatiori di navi nucleari, Diritto ed economia nucleare, vol. 1, 1/1961, pp. 353-365, Colliard, 
J. HANDRLICA, The Rijeka Draft of a Convention on the Liability of Operators...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 40, br. 3, 1153-1174 (2019) 1157
concerning the issues of jurisdiction and the establishment of a limitation fund), the 
Diplomatic Conference was resumed.19 
The Diplomatic Conference was re-opened in Brussels on 14th May 1962, 
with its sole purpose to complete work on the international treaty regulating nuclear 
liability arising from the operation of nuclear-powered vessels.20 Here, the Brussels 
Convention on the Liability of Nuclear Ships (thereinafter “the Brussels Convention”) 
was adopted. The Brussels Convention was opened for signature by the states 
represented at the Diplomatic Conference on 25th May 1962. 
However, the impact of the Rijeka Draft was not limited to a single international 
agreement. On contrary, the Rijeka Draft influenced the content of a number of 
bilateral agreements concluded by the licensing States of nuclear ships with other 
States, in order to gain access to their ports. So, the United States concluded a series of 
so called “Savannah Agreements” to govern legal issues arising from the entry of the 
nuclear-powered cargo-passenger ship, “NS Savannah”, to foreign ports. The first of 
these agreements was concluded with Greece in June, 1962.21 In similar fashion, the 
Federal Republic of Germany concluded a series of bilateral agreements with regard 
to the nuclear-powered cargo ship “Otto Hahn”, with the first being concluded with 
the Netherlands in 1968.22 
Reflecting this wide impact of the Rijeka Draft, the 60th anniversary of its 
adoption offers a good opportunity to revisit the principles provided by the draft 
convention. This article also aims to show what impact the Rijeka Draft had for the 
subsequent development of international nuclear law worldwide. 
2. PRINCIPLES PROVIDED BY THE RIJEKA DRAFT
The fact is, that at the time the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC assembled 
in Rijeka in September, 1959, there was already a common understanding on certain 
principles of nuclear liability. The first national legislation, addressing this issue, was 
adopted in Europe only few months after the Nineteenth Conference resumed its work 
C., La Convention de Bruxelles relative á la responsabilité des exploitants de navires nucléaires, 
Annuaire français de droit international, vol. VIII, 1962, pp. 41-51, Könz, P., The 1962 Brussels 
convention on the liability of operators of nuclear ships, American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 57, 1/1963, pp. 101-120, Hoog, G., Henkmann, M., Wallas, I., Die Konvention über 
die Haftung der Inhaber von Atomschiffen, A. Metzner, Hamburg, 1970, pp. 18-20, Legendre, 
A., La conférence diplomatique de Bruxelles de 1962, Droit maritime français, vol. 39, 1962, 
pp. 575-578, Zaldivar, E., Responsabilidad emergente de la exploitacion de buques nucleares, 
Jornadas sobre derecho de la navegaticion, vol. 1, 1/1961, pp. 117-138. 
19 Könz, P., op. cit., pp. 102-104.
20 loc. cit. 
21 Brown, J., Nuclear Ship Savannah and the Law, University of Florida Law Review, vol. 15, 
2/1962, p. 300.
22 Beemelmans, H., Internationalprivatrechtliche Fragen der Haftung für Reaktorschiffe, Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, vol. 41, 1/1977, pp. 19-20.
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– in the Federal Republic of Germany,23 the United Kingdom24 and Switzerland.25
These first national acts provided for principles of nuclear liability, which differ 
considerably from the liability principles under ordinary tort law: the channelling of 
liability to the operator, the liability limitation, mandatory insurance and the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the courts of the installation State. These principles were later reflected 
in two major international conventions, addressing the issues of nuclear liability; in 
both the Paris and Vienna Conventions.26 
However, both the Paris and Vienna Conventions explicitly included only land-
based nuclear reactors27 and excluded those nuclear reactors that are transportable.28 
Therefore, the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC had to address the challenge, to also 
apply these liability principles to those nuclear reactors used in maritime transport. 
Before analysing the liability principles, as provided by the Rijeka Draft, certain 
remarks of substantive character must be heard: 
Firstly, the Rijeka Draft never intended to establish a liability regime applicable 
to conventional ships merely transporting nuclear material. This issue had to be 
covered by provisions on liability transfer, later provided by the Paris Convention and 
the Vienna Convention.29 
Secondly, the Rijeka Draft did not address those issues of nuclear safety, arising 
from the operation of nuclear ships. These issues were left for other more specialised 
instruments of international law.30 In this respect, it is interesting to note that these 
safety issues became a subject of discussion at the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 
Conference in London, which was held in London from 17th May to 17th June, 1960.31 
Thirdly, the Rijeka Draft did not aspire to establish a universal framework, 
governing the entry of nuclear ships to foreign ports. The intention was merely to pave 
23 Gesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren 
vom 23. Dezember 1959
24 Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959.
25 Bundesgesetz über die friedliche Verwendung der Atomenergie vom 23. December, 1959.
26 Hardy, M., Nuclear Liability: General Principles of Law and Further Proposals, British 
Yearbook of International Law, vol. 36, 1960, pp. 223-249.
27 Paris Convention, Art. 1.a.ii., Vienna Convention, Art. I.1.j.
28 There is a slight difference between the wording of the Paris and the Vienna Conventions. 
While the Paris Convention excludes any reactors “comprised in any means of transport”, the 
Vienna Convention merely excludes those reactors, “with which a means of sea or air transport 
is equipped for use as a source of power.” This restrictive exclusion in the provision of the 
Vienna Convention reflected the then existing project of small nuclear reactors, intended to 
provide electricity in terrestrial rescue actions. Such nuclear reactors were intended to be 
operated stationary; however, they were to be equipped by a vehicle in order to be transported 
to a site of rescue operation.
29 The Convention relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material 
was adopted in 1971. The purpose of this convention was to ensure that the operator of a 
nuclear installation rather than the owner of a vessel will be exclusively liable for damage 
caused by a nuclear incident occurring in the course of maritime carriage of nuclear material. 
The Convention entered into force in 1975
30 Berman, W., Hydeman, L., International Control of the Safety of Nuclear-Powered Merchant 
Ships, Michigan Law Review, vol. 59, 2/1960, pp. 236-238.
31 loc. cit. 
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the way for further bi-lateral negotiations in this regard between concerned licensing 
States and the prospective port States.32 
Lastly, the Rijeka Draft aimed to address liability issues arising from nuclear 
ships, i.e. “any ship equipped for utilization of nuclear fuel”.33 
Consequently, the draft aimed to cover nuclear-propelled ships, i.e. those ships, 
where a nuclear reactor serves as a means of transport. However, other ships, also 
carrying a nuclear reactor were covered by the draft, e.g. those carrying a nuclear 
reactor serving for oceanographic purposes,34 or carrying a reactor for the purpose of 
producing electricity (transportable nuclear power plants). 
Therefore, the scope of the application of the Rijeka Draft was much broader 
than to only nuclear-propelled ships. 
2.1. Absolute and exclusive liability of the operator
In its Article II, the Rijeka Draft provided that the operator of a nuclear ship 
should be held absolutely and exclusively liable for nuclear damage, upon proof that 
the cause was a nuclear incident involving the fuel of the nuclear ship or radioactive 
waste, produced in the ship. The principle of absolute and exclusive liability of the 
operator was subsequently adopted in three international conventions, adopted in 
following years in the field of nuclear liability (in the Paris,35 Brussels36 and Vienna 
Conventions37). 
In regard to the exclusive liability of the operator, the Nineteenth Conference 
of the IMC concluded that the interests of the victims of a possible marine nuclear 
incident would be best served by coalescing their rights to compensation upon one 
party. This model would obviate a multiplicity of actions, some of which might require 
proof of negligence. Consequently, the principle of exclusive liability of the operator 
leads to exoneration of all other potential liable subjects, such as manufacturer of 
nuclear reactor.38 
A further consideration for introducing excusive liability of the operator was the 
desire to protect non-nuclear ship operators from potential high liability for nuclear 
damage even in instances where such nuclear damage would arise from the negligence 
of those in charge of the non-nuclear ship.39 If the rule were otherwise, non-nuclear 
ship operators would be obliged to carry extended insurance covering this risk upon 
the seas. The result would be a considerable burden in increased marine insurance 
32 Handrlica, J., Underground repositories, reprocessing facilities and floating nuclear power 
plants: liability issues revisited, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law, vol. 37, 2019, pp. 
284-285.
33 Rijeka Draft, Article I. 
34 Sözer, B., Liability of the Operators of Nuclear Ships according to Brussels Convention of 25th 
May, 1962, Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku Dergisi, vol. 7, 4/ 1974, p. 868.
35 Paris Convention, Article 6.b.
36 Brussels Convention, Article II.2. 
37 Vienna Convention, Article II.5.
38 In practical terms, we are speaking here about the industry of the United States.
39 Thornton, W., op. cit., p. 11.
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premiums with no particular benefit to the non-nuclear ship operator.40
In this respect, the Rijeka Draft provided for two cases, when right of recourse 
was given to the operator vis-á-vis third persons. Firstly, in cases where the nuclear 
damage is the result of the act or omission of another, done with the intent to cause 
such damage, the operator of a nuclear ship would have right of recourse against 
the wrongdoer. This recourse was later reflected in the Brussels Convention.41 The 
other exception would apply where a right of indemnity is expressly provided by 
a contract. Also, this exception was later reflected in the Brussels Convention.42 In 
fact, the Brussels Convention also provided for a third exception,43 which reflected 
the circumstance where the nuclear incident occurred because of a wreck-raising 
operation.  
The Rijeka Draft also provided, that the operator of a non-nuclear ship should 
be entitled to recover from the operator of nuclear ship for nuclear damage suffered 
by the non-nuclear ship, even in instances where such damage was caused by the 
negligence of the non-nuclear ship. Hereby, the IMC wanted to reflect e.g. a situation, 
when a harbourmaster, or pier superintendent were to give negligent instructions to a 
nuclear ship during docking operation. In this respect, the IMC aimed at securing, the 
port authority will be barred from recovery of damages to the port and installations.44 
However, this provision was not reflected later by the Brussels Convention, as it was 
deemed as not necessary, due to the concept of absolute liability.45 
Further, the Rijeka Draft provided for certain exonerations from operator’s 
liability. Consequently, the operator was to be exonerated from his liability with 
respect to nuclear damage caused by a nuclear incident directly due to an act of war, 
hostilities, civil war or insurrection. These exoneration titles were also later reflected 
in the provisions of the Brussels Convention.46 
Here, it is necessary to mention, that while the Rijeka Draft did effectively 
exonerate the manufacturers of nuclear reactors from any liability caused by their 
products by channelling the liability exclusively to the operators of nuclear ships, 
the risk of potential manufacturers liability was still felt.47 Subsequently, the Brussels 
Convention provided48 for an additional mechanism to exclude the manufacturers 
from potential liability by stating,  that the treaty will continue to apply to any nuclear 
ship licensed for operation by any State while still a Contracting Party to this treaty, 
with respect to any nuclear incident occurring no later than twenty five years after 
such licensing.
40 loc. cit. 
41 Brussels Convention, Article II.6.a. 
42 Brussels Convention, Article II.6.c.
43 Brussels Convention, Article II.6.b.
44 Thornton, W., op. cit, p. 11. 
45 Govare, J., Le droit maritime en matiére nucléaire, Aspects de droit de lʼenérgie atomique, vol. 
1, 1965, p. 220.
46 Brussels Convention, Article VIII. 
47 Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, p. 109.
48 Brussels Convention, Article XIX. 
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2.2. Liability limitation and its coverage
Further, the Rijeka Draft provided for limitation of operator’s liability in its 
Article III. The principle of liability limitation has been known to international 
maritime law from other existing conventions (the Brussels International Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of 
Owners of Sea-Going Vessels, the Brussels International Convention Relating to the 
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Vessels). The liability limitation 
was considered as a quid pro quo for very strict liability requirements, provided for 
the operator. Therefore, the liability limitation was also provided later by the Paris49 
and Vienna50 Conventions.
While the Rijeka Draft provided for liability limitation, the respective amount 
of the liability limit remained unresolved at the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC. 
Several proposals were made, with maximum limits of liability ranging from 100 
million US $ to 500 million US $ (the later was the aggregate amount, provided 
at that time by the US legislation for the case where a nuclear incident was caused 
by the nuclear ship “Savannah”).51 However, it was merely agreed that the liability 
limit must be high enough in order to make nuclear ships acceptable in all ports of 
the world.52 Consequently, the Article III.i. merely provided that “An operator of a 
nuclear ship shall in no circumstances be liable for more than ….. in respect of any 
one nuclear incident.” Thus, providing for the respective liability limit was left for 
further diplomatic discussions.53 
Further, the Rijeka Draft provided in its Article III.ii., that the operator maintains 
adequate insurance, specified by the licensing State. 
The Brussels Convention reflected the proposals made by the Rijeka Draft, 
providing54 for liability limit of 1,500 million francs in respect to any single nuclear 
incident, notwithstanding that the nuclear incident may have resulted from any fault 
or privity of that operator. Concerning the currency used, the Brussels Convention 
provided55 that “the franc mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article is a unit of account 
constituted by sixty-five and one half milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness nine 
hundred. The amount awarded may be converted into each national currency in round 
figures. Conversion into national currencies other than gold shall be effected on the 
basis of their gold value at the date of payment.”
Consequently, the liability limit, as provided by the Brussels Convention was 
a floating one, depending on the actual value of gold. A similar approach was also 
chosen in the liability regime established under the Vienna Convention.56 Concerning 
49 Paris Convention, Article 7.b.
50 Vienna Convention, Article V.
51 Thornton, W., op. cit, p. 12.
52 loc. cit. 
53 Bönte, E., La limitation de la responsabilité des propriétaires et exploitants de navires 
conventionneles et nucléaires, Journal des Tribunaux, vol 78, 4/1963, pp. 418.
54 Brussels Convention, Article III.1.
55 Brussels Convention Article III.4.
56 Vienna Convention, Article V.3. 
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mandatory insurance, the Brussels Convention basically copied the provision as 
provided by the Rijeka Draft and left the amount of insurance to be decided by the 
respective licensing State.57
In this respect, it is worthy to note that the principle of liability limitation wasn’t 
un-controversial during negotiations within the Eleventh Session of the Diplomatic 
Conference on Maritime Law. Several States defended the opinion that nuclear 
liability concerning the operation of warships should be unlimited. However, in the 
end it was agreed to extend the benefit of limiting liability to military vessels as well.58 
A further controversy was linked to the setting of actual liability limits. Basically, 
two trends were represented at the Eleventh Session, the difference mainly comprised 
in the relation between liability limits and the possibilities within insurance markets. 
One group of delegations, represented basically by the United States, supported 
establishing a high limit of liability regardless of the possibilities within the insurance 
market. The opposite view was represented mainly by the Scandinavian states, the 
Soviet Union and Liberia, which favoured setting the limit of liability regarding the 
capacities of the international insurance market and without involving the financial 
guarantees from the licensing state.59 
Subsequently, the Brussels Convention placed the liability limit much higher 
than the Paris Convention60 and the later Vienna Convention.61 At the time of the 
Conventions’ adoption and even for a decade after it,62 the limit was considered in 
excess of total coverage available in the existing insurance markets. Thus, the limit 
directly caused certain hesitation of the signatory States to ratify the Convention.63
Finally, the Brussels Convention provided64 for one circumstance under which 
the limitation was not applicable. This was for the circumstance where a nuclear ship 
flew the flag of a Contracting Party but wasn’t licensed or authorized at the time of 
the incident. 
2.3. Rules of jurisdiction
In Article VII, the Rijeka Draft provided rules on jurisdiction. These rules 
reflected a compromise between two conflicting desires. On one hand, there was desire 
to provide for an exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the licensing State. This was 
a principle, which was later provided in both the Paris65 and Vienna Conventions.66 
This principle clearly reflected the fact that insurance capacities are cumulated in the 
State where operation of the nuclear installation was permitted. Also, it reflected the 
57 Brussels Convention Article III.2. 
58 Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, p. 102.
59 ibid, p. 103, and especially in notes 15, 17 and 18.  
60 5 million Monetary Units of the European Currency Convention of 1958 as minimum and 15 
million of Monetary Units as maximum.
61 5 million gold US $ as minimum. 
62 Szasz, P., op. cit., p. 556.
63 loc. cit. 
64 Brussels Convention, Article XV.2. 
65 Paris Convention, Article XIII. 
66 Vienna Convention, Article XI. 
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liability limitation and the subsequent need for the sole competence of one particular 
court. 
However, the principle of exclusive jurisdiction was not deemed to be fully 
applicable vis-á-vis nuclear ships. Only a minority of the participants in the Nineteenth 
Conference of the IMC came from States that were presumed to launch and license 
nuclear ships. Therefore, a greater emphasis on the protection of the potential victims 
was offered and the Nineteenth Conference favoured potential victims having a 
possibility to claim in the court of their domicile.67
Reflecting the above, the Rijeka Draft provided that actions for compensation 
shall be brought, at the option of the claimant, either by the courts of the licensing 
State, or in the courts of the State where the nuclear incident occurred. In the latter 
case, final judgements would become enforceable in the courts of the licensing State 
as soon as “the requirements of the law of the licensing State have been complied 
with”.68 This jurisdictional provision was included to meet obvious objections from 
certain States, in particular from the United States.69
Consequently, the rules of jurisdiction, as provided by the Rijeka Draft, were 
reflected in the provisions of the Brussels Convention. Here, it was provided that “the 
victim has the possibility to claim either by the court of the licensing state or by the 
court of the contracting party on whose territory the nuclear damage was sustained.”70 
An exemption was made concerning warships, where an exclusive jurisdiction of the 
licensing State was provided.71
3. IMPACT OF THE RIJEKA DRAFT FOR FURTHER 
DEVELOPMENT
The 60th anniversary of the Rijeka Draft represents a good opportunity to analyse 
the impact of principles adopted for the further development of international nuclear 
law. 
On one hand, as analysed above, the Rijeka Draft strongly influenced the 
provisions of the Brussels Convention, adopted at the Eleventh Session of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law in 1962. In this respect, it must be mentioned 
that the Brussels Convention was adopted by a relatively close vote of twenty-eight 
in favour from the fifty participants. Ten participating countries, including the only 
two states operating nuclear-powered vessels at the time, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, opposed the text of the Brussels Convention. The Scandinavian 
countries abstained, mainly on the ground of high limits of liability. Eight of the fifty 
67 At the Eleventh Session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law, another proposal was 
made by France, Italy and the United Arab Republic, which provided for the jurisdiction of the 
licensing State and the coastal States within 50 or 100 miles of the place where the incident 
occurred. See Hardy, M. op. cit., p. 784. 
68 E.g. the right to be heard.
69 Thornton, W., op. cit, p. 12. 
70 Brussels Convention, Article X.1. 
71 Brussels Convention, Article X.3. 
J. HANDRLICA, The Rijeka Draft of a Convention on the Liability of Operators...
Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, vol. 40, br. 3, 1153-1174 (2019)1164
delegations were absent at the time of the final vote.72 
The Brussels Convention was signed by 16 States.73 Pursuant to its Article 
XXIV.1, it “shall come into force three months after the deposit of an instrument of 
ratification by at least one licensing State and one other State.” Nevertheless, only 3 
of the signatory States have deposed their documents of ratification.74  Further, 3 other 
States acceded to the Brussels Convention.75 Due to the fact that no licensing State 
ever ratified it, the Brussels Convention failed to enter into force.
Consequently, the Brussels Convention is recently considered a “still-born” 
international convention. There were several reasons for this failure.76 Firstly, while 
the subject of much expectation, nuclear propulsion failed to prove its ability to be a 
prospective means of marine propulsion. Actually, there have been only four nuclear-
powered civil ships in operation.77 The fate of the NS Savannah, which was launched 
only two months before the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC assembled in Rijeka, 
illustrates the entire issue. 
NS Savannah was designed as a visually impressive luxury yacht, carrying thirty 
air-conditioned staterooms, a dining facility for 100 passengers, a lounge a swimming 
pool and a library. By many measures, the ship was a success. However, many of their 
competitors could accommodate several times the cargo of the NS Savannah. The 
crew was a third larger than comparable oil-fired ships and had to receive additional 
training after completing all requirements for conventional maritime licenses. The 
operating budget had to include maintenance of a separate shore organization to 
negotiate port visits. 
Consequently, the US Maritime Administration decommissioned the NS 
Savannah in order to save costs in 1972. In fact, the only area where nuclear propulsion 
showed its long-term success, was the Arctic, where the Soviet Union proceeded to 
operate nuclear icebreakers for ocean and river transport. However, as Peider Könz 
had already correctly predicted in 1963,78 the Soviet Union will have no interest in 
ratifying the Brussels Convention, unless expecting the nuclear icebreakers to enter 
foreign harbours. 
Secondly, there was a very sensitive issue of the applicability of the liability 
72 Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, p. 100.
73 Belgium, Republic of China (Taipei), Republic of Korea, Federal Republic of Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Monaco, Panama, the Netherlands, Philippines, 
Portugal, Republic, United Arab Republic and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
74 Portugal (1968), the Netherlands (1974) and Lebanon (1975). Furthermore, the Republic of 
Surinam did so as a successor of the Netherlands in 1974.
75 Republic of Madagascar (1965), Democratic Republic of Congo (1967) and the Syrian Arab 
Republic (1975).
76 Handrlica, J., The Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships: 
Expectations, Basic Principles and the Reasons of Failure, Czech Yearbook of Public and 
Private International Law, vol. 5, 2014, pp. 121-138. 
77 NS Savannah (licensed by the United States and operated 1959-1972), NS Mutsu (licensed by 
Japan and operated 1970-1992), NS Otto Hahn (licensed by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and operated 1968-1979) and NS Sevmorput (a nuclear-powered cargo ship with ice breaking 
abilities, licensed by the Soviet Union and operated since 1988). 
78 Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, p. 109.
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regime to nuclear warships. The arguments in favour of the inclusion of nuclear 
warships in the liability regime to be established were very pragmatic. Considering 
the development since the very beginning of the use of nuclear energy for the purposes 
of marine propulsion, there was a common understanding that, for many years to 
come, nuclear propulsion will be used chiefly for nuclear warships.79 Because of this, 
nuclear warships were expected to represent a considerable part of future nuclear 
fleets. Therefore, they were considered a real hazard, against which protection should 
not only be available to the general public, but also to conventional shipping. 
On the other hand, there were persuasive arguments against incorporation 
of nuclear warships under the umbrella of the planned liability regime. Firstly, the 
argument was presented that rules concerning warships have no place in a convention 
governing civil liability, since any accident involving these will primarily engage 
the international responsibility of States. Secondly, pursuant to another argument, 
incorporation of warships into the liability regime of an international convention 
would mean that Contracting Parties to the respective convention legalize the use of 
nuclear energy for military purposes. 
And finally, problems of constitutional and administrative nature were pointed 
out, arising from potential submission of warships to foreign courts. Facing these very 
sensitive arguments, the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC left the issue unresolved, 
appending a recommendation to the Rijeka Draft, stating that “nothing in the draft is 
intended to authorise or require inspection of military ships or auxiliaries nor create a 
right to attach such ships.”80
Further developments proved that the issue of inclusion of warships under the 
newly established liability regime became the subject of major controversy. The 
United States, together with the Soviet Union, vehemently opposed such inclusion at 
the Eleventh Session of the Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Law. However, this 
opposition had to face a serious bloc of votes led by the United Kingdom and supported 
by the delegations from the Asian, Latin American and Western European states (with 
the exception of Belgium).81 Thus, the warships were included into the liability regime, 
as established by the Brussels Convention.82 According to contemporary authors,83 it 
was this inclusion that caused hesitation by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union to sign, or accede to the Brussels Convention.  
Thirdly, neither the Rijeka Draft, not the Brussels Convention addressed the 
issue of entry of nuclear ships into foreign ports. Consequently, in order to facilitate 
the entry of their nuclear ships into foreign ports, the licensing States were awaited to 
conclude separate bi-lateral agreements, governing issues of entry and stay of the ship 
in the respective port. Concluding such agreements was left to the discretion of the 
concerned licensing and port States.84 From this perspective, the licensing States did 
79 Hardy, M., op. cit., pp. 787-792, Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of 
Operators of Nuclear Ships, pp. 109-111, Szasz, P., op. cit. sub, pp. 553-555.
80 Thornton, W., op. cit., p. 12.
81 Könz, P., The 1963 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, p. 108. 
82 Brussels Convention, Article I.11. 
83 Szasz, P., op. cit., p. 563, sub note 118.
84 Interestingly enough, the contemporary literature refers, that certain port States did not require 
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not considered ratification of the Brussels Convention as a necessary step to further 
facilitate developments of nuclear propulsion, as the required legal framework was 
provided by respective bi-lateral agreements. 
And lastly, both the Rijeka Draft and the Brussels Convention reflected the model 
of civil liability for nuclear damage, i.e. liability of an operator. The Eastern bloc 
showed certain opposition to this concept, advocating that rather than the principles 
of civil liability, the responsibility of the State under international public law must be 
applied to nuclear incidents.
Consequently, the legal scholarship of the Eastern bloc criticized the principles 
of nuclear liability as reflecting the interests of the nuclear industry, rather than an 
interest in compensating potential victims.85 This position basically precluded any 
participation of the Eastern bloc in the international conventions, providing for 
liability regime for nuclear damages. The only salient exception was the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ratified the Vienna Convention on 12th August, 
1977. 
While the Brussels Convention is currently considered a “stillborn” international 
convention, the impact of the Rijeka Draft for international nuclear law was much 
broader. The liability principles provided by the Rijeka Draft were reflected in the 
provisions of bi-lateral agreements concluded by the licensing States (the United States 
and the Federal Republic of Germany), operating nuclear ships entering foreign ports. 
The first of these agreements was concluded between the United States and Greece in 
June of 1962,86 in order to facilitate prospective entry of the nuclear-powered cargo-
passenger ship “NS Savannah” to Greek ports. In the following years, the United 
States continued to conclude similar agreements with other port States.87 
The Federal Republic of Germany concluded the first of bi-lateral agreements 
on entry of the nuclear ship “Otto Hahn” with the Netherlands in October, 1968. Soon 
after, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a similar agreement with Liberia 
(May, 1970), Portugal (January, 1971), Argentina (May, 1971) and finally Brazil 
(June, 1972).88 These agreements basically followed the principles of the liability of 
inclusion of any international convention for using their ports by a nuclear ship. In the late 
1960s, the German nuclear ship “Otto Hahn” visited the ports of Morocco, Iran, Mauritania, 
Senegal and Togo without any existing bi-lateral agreements. See Nuclear Law Bulletin, 
6/1970, p. 37. 
85 Ioirish, A., Atom i pravo, Mezdunarodnyie otnoshenyia, Moskva, 1969, pp. 171-173.
86 Brown, J., op. cit., p. 300.
87 Boulanger, W., International conventions and agreements on nuclear ships, Nuclear Law for 
a Developing World, vol 5, 1969, pp. 179-185, Klarr, H.., Loosch, R.., Rechtsfragen zum 
kommerziellen Einsatz der Savannah in deutschen Gewässern, Atomwirtschaft, vol. 10, 10/1965, 
pp. 553-563, Kovar, R., Les accords conclus au sujet du Savannah et la responsibilité civile des 
exploitants de navires nucléaires, Annuaire française de droit international, vol. 11, 1965, pp. 
783-809, Lucchini, L., Voelckel, M., Colloque: Droit nucléaire et droit oceanique, 12-13 juin 
1975,  Economica, Paris, 1977, pp. 20-22, Pelzer, N., Aktuelle internationalrechtliche Probleme 
der friedlichen Reaktorschiffahrt, In: Bernhardt, R., Rudolf, W. (eds), Die Schiffahrtsfreiheilt 
im gegenwärtigen Völkerrecht, Berichte der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht, Karlsruhe, 
1975, pp. 75-85. 
88 Beemelmans, H., Internationalprivatrechtliche Fragen der Haftung für Reaktorschiffe, Rabels 
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the operator of nuclear ships, as provided by the Rijeka Draft and later by the Brussels 
Convention. 
However, certain special rules were provided by these bi-lateral agreements for 
further specification of liability conditions. Thus, the Agreement between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands, adopted on 28th October, 1968,89 provided 
for a liability limit of 400 million Deutschmark, which was at that time higher than 
the liability limit  provided by the Brussels Convention.90 Further, the Agreement 
also provided, that the Regional Court in the Haag is exclusively competent to deal 
with liability claims.91 The rather high liability limit of 400 million Deutschmark 
was also provided in the Agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Liberia, adopted on 27th May, 1970.92 However, this Agreement provided, that the 
claimant will have choice of jurisdiction between the court of the licensing State and 
the port State.93 The agreements the Federal Republic of Germany concluded with 
Argentina (on 21st May, 197194) and Brazil (on 7th June, 197295) basically referred to 
the provisions of the Brussels Convention without any deviation. 
Lastly, it is interesting to add that the Rijeka Draft also influenced national 
legislation. This was the case of the Netherlands, which was a signatory State to the 
Brussels Convention. In order to enlarge the rules of liability, as established by this 
Convention, also vis-á-vis prospective nuclear ships licensed by non-contracting States, 
the Netherlands issued an Act containing regulations on the liability of operators of 
nuclear ships in 1973 (Wet houdende regelen inzake wettelijke aansprakelijkheid van 
exploitanten van nukleare shepen).96 As of today, the Act is still valid. 
4. CONCLUSIONS
“Will these ships be welcomed in the ports of the world or will they, like 
the fable “Flying Dutchman”, be destined to sail the high seas until the day of the 
judgement, barred from entering port?”97 The question posed by Commander William 
H. Thornton, when reflecting the Rijeka Draft in 1960, can clearly be answered today. 
Civil nuclear ships were a failure. They proved not to be commercially attractive 
and, consequently, all interest in multiplying civil nuclear fleets faded. The only field 
where nuclear propulsion proved successful was Arctic transport. However, as the 
nuclear icebreakers did not enter foreign ports, there has been never a need to cover 
them by a respective international convention. 
The Rijeka Draft, as adopted at the Nineteenth Conference of the IMC 60 years 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, vol. 41, 1/1977, pp. 19-23.
89 BGBl. 1969 II 1121. 
90 Beemelmans, H., op. cit., p. 20.
91 loc. cit. 
92 BGBl. 1971 II 953. 
93 Beemelmans, H., op. cit., p. 22.
94 BGBl. 1972 II 68. 
95 BGBl. 1974 II 685.
96 Netherlands ratified the Brussels Convention in 1974. 
97 Thornton, W., op. cit., p. 9. 
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ago, was a product of legal foresight. In the field of international nuclear law, the Rijeka 
Draft is a salient example of an instrument that does not merely react to an incident that 
has already happened, but aims to a provide legal framework that facilitates relations 
arising by potential incidents in the future. Despite the fact, the Rijeka Draft failed to 
provide a base for a working multilateral liability framework, it must be viewed as a 
product of legal futurism, awaiting certain technological developments in the future 
and paving the way for its realisation. 
Most recently, the discussions on further development of nuclear power in naval 
transport are again en vogue. The Russian Federation and China announced their 
plans to operate transportable nuclear power plants and to offer them to other States 
on a commercial basis. Such developments will again98  trigger the liability principles, 
adopted by the Rijeka Draft, as special bi-lateral agreements will be needed to facilitate 
the operation of such transportable installations. 
Consequently, the Rijeka Draft proved to be an instrument that had a broad 
impact on international nuclear law over the last decades. Potentially, and depending 
on further developments, the principles adopted will also be reflected in the future. 
Therefore, the Draft deserved a requiem to be made in the year of its 60th anniversary. 
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Jakub Handrlica*99
Sažetak
RIJEČKI NACRT KONVENCIJE O ODGOVORNOSTI 
PODUZETNIKA-BRODARA NUKLEARNIH BRODOVA: 
KASNI REKVIJEM
U Rijeci je pred šezdeset godina od 20. do 26. rujna 1959. održana devetnaesta 
konferencija Međunarodnog pomorskog odbora (Comité Maritime International). 
Suočavajući se s izazovima proizašlim iz korištenja nuklearne energije u pomorskom 
prijevozu (posebice vezano uz korištenje nuklearnih reaktora kao izvora prijevoza 
u putničkim i vojnim brodovima, na konferenciji je usvojen jedan nacrt, čiji je cilj 
bio dotaći se odgovornosti poduzetnika-brodara nuklearnih brodova. Taj je nacrt 
reflektirao činjenicu da se odgovornost poduzetnika-brodara nuklearnih brodova 
znatno razlikuje od odgovornosti koja proizlazi iz nuklearnih reaktora smještenih na 
čvrstom tlu. Ovaj nacrt, koji je kasnije u pravnoj literaturi postao poznat kao „Riječki 
nacrt”, predvidio je temeljna načela odgovornosti za poduzetnike-brodare nuklearnih 
brodova. Odigrao je i veliku ulogu u  kasnijem razvoju međunarodnog nuklearnog 
prava, posebice pri usvajanju briselske Konvencije o odgovornosti poduzetnika-
brodara nuklearnih brodova na jedanaestoj sjednici Diplomatske konferencije za 
pomorsko pravo 1962. godine. Utjecao je i na sadržaj nekih drugih bilateralnih 
sporazuma. Šezdeseta obljetnica Riječkog nacrta izvrsna je prilika za preispitivanje 
njegovih načela kao i njegovog utjecaja na  daljnji razvoj međunarodnog nuklearnog 
prava. 
Ključne riječi: odgovornost za nuklearnu štetu; nuklearni brodovi; 




ÜBEREINKOMMENS: EIN SEHR SPÄTES REQUIEM
Die Neunzehnte Konferenz des Internationalen Seeschifffahrtsausschusses 
(Comité Maritime International) wurde vor sechzig Jahren vom 20. bis zum 26. 
September 1959 in Rijeka gehalten. Als Antwort auf die Herausforderungen bezüglich 
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der Nuklearenergienutzung in der Seeschifffahrt (insbesondere bezüglich der Nutzung 
von Kernreaktoren als Transportquelle für sowohl Passagier- als auch Militärschiffe), 
nahm die Konferenz einen Entwurf an, mit dem Ziel, die Haftung der Betreiber von 
Nuklearschiffen anzusprechen. Dieser Entwurf wiederspiegelte die Tatsache, dass die 
Haftung, die sich aus Nuklearschiffen ergibt, sich von der mit der Betreibung von 
landgestützten Kernreaktoren verbundenen Haftung wesentlich unterscheidet. 
Dieser Entwurf, der später auch als „Rijeka-Entwurf“ in der Rechtsliteratur 
bekannt wurde, hat grundlegende Haftungsgrundsätze für Betreiber der Nuklearschiffe 
vorgesehen. Der Rijeka-Entwurf spielte eine große Rolle bei späteren Entwicklungen 
im Bereich des internationalen Nuklearrechtes, insbesondere bei der Annahme des 
Brüssel-Übereinkommens über die Haftung von Betreiber der Nuklearschiffe auf der 
Elften Tagung der Diplomatischen Seerechtkonferenz in 1962. Er hat aber auch den 
Inhalt von einigen anderen bilateralen Übereinkommen beeinflusst. Das sechszigste 
Jubiläum des Rijeka-Entwurfs bietet die Gelegenheit an, die Grundsätze des Entwurfs 
sowie auch sein Einfluss auf weitere Entwicklungen des internationalen Nuklearrechts 
erneut zu überprüfen.
Schlüsselwörter: Nuklearhaftung; Nuklearschiffe; internationales Nuklearrecht; 
internationales Seerecht; Haftungsgrundsätze.
Riassunto
IL DISEGNO FIUMANO DELLA CONVENZIONE SULLA 
RESPONSABILITA’ DEGLI OPERATORI DELLE NAVI 
NUCLEARI: UN TARDO REQUIEM 
Sessant’anni fa dal 20 al 26 settembre del 1959 si tenne a Fiume la novantesima 
Conferenza del Comitato marittimo internazionale (Comité Maritime International). 
Nell’approcciarsi alle sfide derivanti dai piani contemporanei di usare l’energia 
nucleare nel trasporto marittimo (in particolare di usare i reattori nucleari quale fonte 
per il trasporto sia di navi civili, che militari), la Conferenza adottò un disegno di 
convenzione avente lo scopo di porre in rilievo la questione della responsabilità degli 
operatori di navi nucleari. Il disegno di convenzione manifestò il fatto che le questioni 
della responsabilità derivanti dalle navi nucleari differiscono considerevolmente 
rispetto a quelle questioni derivanti dalle operazioni dei reattori nucleari su 
terraferma. Tale disegno di convenzione, che successivamente divenne noto nella 
letteratura giuridica come “the Rijeka Draft”, offrì i principi fondamentali in materia 
di responsabilità che si sarebbero dovuti applicare agli operatori delle navi nucleari. 
Il “Rijeka Draft” divenne di importanza cruciale per i successivi sviluppi nel campo 
del diritto nucleare internazionale ed in ispecie per l’adozione della Convenzione 
di Bruxelles sulla responsabilità delle navi nucleari all’undicesima sessione della 
conferenza diplomatica sul diritto marittimo nel 1962. Ad ogni modo, esso influenzò 
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anche il contenuto di alcuni altri accordi bilaterali. Il sessantesimo anniversario del 
“Rijeka Draft” offre una buona opportunità per rivisitare i principi offerti dal disegno 
di convenzione, come anche per rivisitare l’impatto di questo disegno sul futuro 
sviluppo del diritto nucleare internazionale.  
Parole chiave: responsabilità; navi nucleari; diritto internazionale nucleare; 
diritto marittimo internazionale; principi di responsabilità. 

